In his speech to the nation Wednesday night, President Obama authorized strikes against ISIS, the militant group ravaging Syria and Iraq. The United States and its allies, the President said, will aim to “degrade and ultimately destroy” the group.
The speech stirred up mixed reaction, with some applauding the President’s decision, but more calling the strikes insufficient, potentially illegal, and reminiscent of the unpopular decisions of George W. Bush during the second Iraq War.
One aspect of the president’s address proved to be particularly controversial, even though it was not directly mentioned — the role of the United States’ long-time enemy, Iran, in resolving the conflict.
“But it has been a frequent subject of conversation inside the Situation Room and at the off-the-record previews of his strategy that Mr. Obama has held for a stream of foreign policy experts and journalists,” writes David E. Sanger for the Times. This effort, according to senior administration officials “certainly puts them on the same side of the fight as the Iranians.”
“It’s a question that can’t be set aside indefinitely, and could be among the defining challenges of the U.S.-led coalition,” writes Brian Murphy at The Washington Post.
Mr. Murphy argues that Iran has a lot at stake in the conflict, and is likely to become a “strange bedfellow to the West.” There are several reasons for this, he says. He suggests that Iran may emerge as an intermediary between Bashar al-Assad and the United States who does not want to deal with the dictator directly. Another reason is Iran’s significant influence over Shiites in the Middle East. “Iraq’s Shiite factions – and, by extension, Iran – are deeply unsettled by the idea of rising Sunni extremists who condemn Shiite Muslims with the same fervor they denounce the West,” Mr. Murphy writes.
And Tehran has more sway in Baghdad today than Washington, writes Phyllis Bennis for The Nation, composing a speech that Obama “should have given.” “So we need a new partnership—with the United States and Iran joining to push Iraq for a new, inclusive approach to governing.”
It’s not just political influence, Sanam Vakil points out at The New York Daily News.
“Unlike Washington, Tehran already has boots on the ground and is actively training Iraqi troops. Washington has thus far limited its engagement to aerial firepower and coalition-building with the relevant regional
and international players,” writes Ms. Vakil.
All three argue that working together in Iraq could be basis for long-term cooperation between the United States and Iran, especially in the context of the
deadline for nuclear negotiations, whose deadline is set for late November.
Rather than a bilateral partnership,”it should be extended to the Middle East region as a whole and should lay the groundwork for a much-needed regional league of nations where cooperation, coalition building and development of a long-term regional strategy would include all countries of the Middle East,” Ms. Vakil says.
Ms. Vakil points to the previous attempts at cooperation between the two countries, the last being the aftermath of 9/11 when Iran supported the effort against the Taliban. But Iran’s “opaque nuclear program” exacerbated tensions between the countries, and the effort was short-lived.
“Let us not allow this history of needless alienation to repeat itself. Iran is no friend of ISIS.”
David Frum, writing for The Atlantic, agrees that Iran holds the “real power” in Iraq. If ISIS is indeed weakened by U.S. strikes, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps will be those who benefit, those who will “stiffen the demoralized Iraqi army.”
And if the United States were “cold-blooded” and “realpolitik-practicing,” the government would try to take advantage of the situation: “Okay Mr. Ayatollah, we’ll save your bacon—pardon the expression—in Syria and Iraq. But we want something in return…”
But, Mr. Frum continues, the United States will not do so, as it is a “moralistic democracy” in which voters remember “35 years of Iranian terror attacks on Americans around the world.” An alliance with an “unreformed Iran” is highly embarrassing.
“The trouble with the policy of aid-Iran-but-don’t-admit-it is that the United States receives nothing in return—and specifically, no abatement of the Iranian nuclear program.”
Mr. Frum writes that a policy of de-facto helping Iran would “empower the Iranians to act as if they were doing the United States a favor by allowing the United States to whomp their enemies for them.”
At The Boston Globe, General Hugh Shelton, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff spells out what the United States should do instead of embracing Tehran, because through exploiting the “sectarian fissures” in Iraq, Iran had made it a “quiescent client state.”
Instead of allowing Iran to gain concessions in nuclear negotiations — which the country will attempt if it “lures Washington into cooperation”– General Shelton writes, the United States must deny them “and use the negotiations and all other leverage to keep Iran out of Iraq (and Syria’s) affairs, so that those countries can have a chance to stabilize and chart new national destinies.”
Iran itself, however, is not happy with the Mr. Obama’s speech, at least not officially. They feel left out, and object to some of the United States’ allies in the fight against ISIS — Turkey, the Gulf states, and moderate rebel forces in Syria.
“Some of the countries in the coalition are among financial and military supporters of terrorists in Iraq and Syria and some others have reneged on their international duties in the hope of [seeing] their desired political changes in Iraq and Syria,” Marzieh Afkham, spokeswoman for Iran’s Foreign Ministry told journalists in Tehran.
“The US claims it’s fighting terrorism while cooperating with those backing the terrorist groups,” an anonymous senior Iranian official told Al-Monitor.