Kurdistan: The Next Autocracy?
14.6.2013
By Derek Monroe - Foreign Policy In Focus FPIF |
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June 14, 2013
A haze hangs low over the city of Erbil. Automotive
exhaust and dry sand envelop the area, forming an
opaque mixture that sunshine struggles to penetrate.
The capital of northern Iraq’s Kurdistan Autonomous
Region, Erbil operates as a de-facto independent
state, with its own legislative, executive, and
judicial branches. Its soldiers wear their uniforms
with pride, sporting a tricolor symbol of their
country sewn on to them. Meanwhile, Erbil has total
control of its external and internal regional
borders, just as any sovereign state would.
As a result, Erbil is separate from Iraq, and from
that country’s contentious and often deadly politics
in Baghdad. “Separation is a necessary step, as our
representatives have only 90 seats in Iraq’s
parliament (out of 700 plus). Thus we have
absolutely no voice in what is going on,” said
Abdullah, who owns a travel agency in downtown
Erbil. “They often say we will give you money for
this and this, but we want you to do this and that,”
he added. “We, the Kurds, find this unacceptable, as
so many people have died so things will not be the
same as before anymore.”
The sentiment Abdullah expresses prevails among
Kurds who are now, for the first time in history,
living in a state they can call their own. As the
newest petro-state, Kurdistan has enjoyed an
unprecedented level of political and economic
stability since the end of the first Gulf War in
1991. And for the first time ever, the Iraqi Kurds’
economic fortunes are on an upward trend, especially
in comparison with their co-patriots in neighboring
countries, as a sea of oil revenue has lifted most
economic boats.
Yet not all is well in Kurdistan, due in part to
the dominant presence of one ruling family.
Descended from a political dynasty that has built a
power base over centuries of fighting, regional
president Massoud Barzani has blossomed into an
authoritarian ruler not unlike many whose regimes
are now crumbling from the internal pressures of the
Arab Spring.
Organized Corruption
Throughout Erbil, portraits of Barzani adorn the
walls of offices and shops. That is not to say that
Barzani’s cult of personality is as force-fed as
Saddam Hussein’s often was in Iraq. The Barzani clan
has tremendous popularity in the area of its
political base in northern Iraq, and people feel a
genuine reverence for Massoud, whose father led
uprisings against Hussein in the 1960s and ‘70s.
However, the cracks in the family’s image are
accentuated by political dissent, and the official
story of the ruling Kurdish Democratic Party’s (KDP)
road to power has often been challenged. “The people
were the ones who first fought in the city and
defeated Hussein’s troops in 1991’s revolution,”
said Adar, who runs a small hotel downtown. “The
Peshmerga [militia] came down two days later from
the mountains after it was all over and claimed the
power. This is the truth that many people in Erbil
are afraid to speak of,” he said.
The fear to speak out is real, as KDP has both
limited tolerance for criticism and a long memory.
In December 2005, Kamal Qadir, an Austrian scholar,
was
arrested and
sentenced to 30 years in prison for a series of
articles criticizing the Barzanis’ hold on the
economy and power. He was released a year later
after prolonged action to free him by Amnesty
International and the Austrian government.
However, Kurdish journalists
Soran Mama Hama
and
Sardasht Osman
were not so lucky; they were gunned down for writing
about corruption by the political class and local
governments. Demands for thorough and transparent
investigations were met by Kurdish authorities
maneuvering to blame others for the deaths; to this
day both cases remain unsolved. Even a brief
expression of criticism toward the Barzanis, such as
one anonymous caller’s comments on a television
call-in program, resulted in a bombing of the studio
the very next day. As usual, the perpetrators were
never found.
One of the most sensitive subjects is the Barzanis’
involvement in the economy of the newly rich oil
state. While Massoud Barzani’s personal wealth is
estimated to be in the range of $2 billion, the
exact amount of the family’s involvement is unknown
due to Kurdistan’s murky legal environment and a web
of offshore cross-ownership entities. While the
Barzanis often repudiate any reporting that follows
the trail of money, such as a 2010 exposure by the
newspaper Rozhnama that accused them of benefiting
from illegal oil smuggling, the personal behavior of
some family members leads to more questions than
answers.
For example, in 2012, Mansur Barzani, the son of
Massoud, lost over $3.2 million in a Dubai casino
during the elder Barzani’s official state visit.
Meanwhile the other son, Masrour, purchased a
$10-million home in the U.S. state of Virginia.
Officially, they were both living on modest
government salaries—with Masrour heading the
security and intelligence services, which are not
shy to use deadly force to squash protests they find
intolerable, as was demonstrated in 2011 in Erbil,
Halabja, and Sulaimaniyah.
The family’s influence permeates the ruling class
through a steady supply of official perks and status
symbols. The symbol of the KDP elite has become a
fleet of white sport utility vehicles that ply the
pot-holed streets of Erbil at high speeds,
unconcerned about pedestrians or other vehicles.
Official and unofficial oil revenues streaming into
governmental and party coffers compound a growing
resentment over widespread corruption and
mismanagement.
Signs of extreme poverty compete with these images
of imported luxury goods. The contrast is easily
visible at the grand bazaar in front of Erbil’s
famous citadel. Women carrying small children sell
chewing gum to passersby in order to retain what
remains of their dignity. “Life is very hard here,”
said a woman holding a toddler. She declined to give
her name as she approached me. “You wouldn’t know it
because you are not from here. But believe me, every
day of my life is bitter.”
The KDP and its historical rival, the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK), have created interlocking
mechanisms of power distribution and execution that
put both of them in the driver’s seat at the same
time. The balance is often altered slightly in favor
of one or the other party, depending on the
individual at the helm. In the Barzani clan’s case,
the money trail reinforces ancient tribal
allegiances and connections, making a de-facto
“democratic” Barzani dynasty possible.
The dysfunction of organized corruption is most
visible in economic sphere. “The Barzanis and
[current Iraqi President Jalal] Talabani’s PUK own
most of the lucrative businesses in Kurdistan.
Mobile phones, big shopping malls, non-transparent
oil deals. No one exactly knows where the oil income
goes,” said Ari, editor of Austria-based publication
Ekurd.net. The degree of rapaciousness at the
expense of the public interest is often taken to
grotesque proportions. In one example, a
party-dominated cell phone company made huge profits
by charging enormous sums for SIM cards, even when
cell phone reception didn’t work.
A State of Schizophrenia
Large amounts of petro-dollars coming into the
economy are increasingly resulting not only in a
growing divide between rich and poor, but also a
national state of schizophrenia with curious
contradictions. “Having a look at the hospitals and
their services, which are very poor, one cannot help
but say ‘where does the oil income go?’” said Ari.
“Despite exporting over 150,000 barrels per day,
Kurdistan is still importing over 80 percent of the
fuel it needs from Iraq, Iran, and Turkey,” he
concluded.
The Barzanis tout break-neck land development and
new construction as a monument to Kurdish
independence, with new malls, shops, public
buildings, and homes popping up everywhere. The mass
construction along the 100-meter ring road in Erbil
is creating a Nevada-like environment of gated
hamlets for educated elites and expatriate
foreigners. It is widely understood that any major
building project has to have some type of business
connection with the Barzanis, who are pivotal to the
permitting process. Their involvement decides
whether the construction will be a commercial
success or an utter failure.
The rapid construction of this new Kurdistan results
in architectural curiosities. The micro-climate of
the West is often replicated in mass real estate
offerings that have nothing to do with social and
economic realities on the ground. Colonies like
Royal City, English Village, American Village, and
others, along with the wholesale import of fast food
restaurants, have absolutely nothing to do with
local culture or people. This disconnect also
extends to parts of government. For example, the
foreign affairs office is conveniently located next
to a foreign settlement called Italian City, thus
making the trip downtown to witness the
uncomfortable truth unnecessary.
According to the 2012 report on Erbil from
Associates for International Research, Inc., “The
distance from the center to the outermost ring (100m
Street) is approximately 2.5 miles. However, there
is little need for expatriates to venture into the
center of town, since most expatriate shopping
outlets and housing compounds are located along or
near 100m Street, or the outer ring. The Ainkawa
neighborhood, or Christian quarter, is located in
the north of the city.”
As one Western NGO worker who preferred to remain
anonymous commented, “This is the effect of
globalization, parachuted by nuts and bolts into
Iraq, and is as magical as Walt Disney’s or
Universal Studios’ version of life in that part of
the world. All that is missing is Ali Baba and The
Forty Thieves, but even this can arranged.”
Many Kurds sigh in resignation that this is a symbol
of the Barzanis’ rule and expect it to continue
without interruption. This is one possibility, but
others are harder to predict.
A member of parliament in Iraq’s ruling party
recently accused the Kurds of seeking to partition
Iraq along ethnic lines and warned that the
government in Baghdad would not tolerate it. Many
Kurds are increasingly seeing themselves as caught
between a rock (their government) and a hard place
(Baghdad). “Prime Minister Maliki is a little
Saddam. He will not stop in getting all of Iraq’s
lands together as before. He will also come here,
but he knows that Kurds will fight hard. We have no
other choice,” said Adar, who works at the grand
bazaar in the center of Erbil.
It would be a stretch to think that Western
governments remain unaware of Kurdistan’s power
dynamics. Many of them have consulates in Erbil
where developments are constantly being monitored
and reported on. Yet the race to profit from oil and
tap a growing consumer market pushes other
considerations—such as human rights and the
application of democratic principles—into not even
the backseat, but as far back as the trunk of a
speeding car with Kurdish license plates. The
ultimate tolls on this highway to prosperity will be
paid not by the driver but by its passengers, the
Kurds, with growing evidence that the final
destination is different from what had been
advertised.
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